Anyone even peripherally connected to Hong Kong in the last quarter of the 20th century was acutely aware of the use-by date: July 1, 1997. On that day, the British lease on the 86% of the Crown Colony known as the New Territories would conclude, and the sun would set on the British Empire in Asia.
The tabloids called it The Great Chinese Take-Away, or The Hangover. Residents saw it as either glorious, or a tragedy.
The rest of Hong Kong – the Kowloon peninsula, Hong Kong island, and other smaller islands – were ceded to the United Kingdom in perpetuity, or at least until China got its act together enough to want them back. Because just about everything Hong Kong consumed came from China (including water and even some electricity), there was little doubt that Beijing held the upper hand.
There were a few who put hope ahead of common sense and thought that the People’s Republic of China should simply extend the lease for another 99 years. After all, in the early 1980s Hong Kong was the source of more than 70% of the foreign investment going into China, and the conduit to most of its trade. Surely the communist wouldn’t kill the goose that laid so many golden eggs, would they?
Holding this view was a clear sign of unfamiliarity with modern Chinese politics; that so many did is testimony to the poor quality of their education. From my first class on modern China at Cal, it was clear that there were two great themes to 20th century China:
- Throw out the foreigners; and
- Unify the nation.
The first was mainly achieved in 1949, when extraterritoriality treaties were abrogated. The British, French, Germans, Japanese, and others would no longer control key ports, the maritime customs, municipal governments, the courts, and the police. The final act would be the return of Hong Kong and Macau to Chinese sovereignty.
The second would take a little longer.
At the end of the Chinese Civil War, Chiang Kai-shek and the Nationalist (Kuomintang, or KMT) Government of the Republic of China (ROC) retreated to Taiwan. Until and unless China could gain control of that island, the task of unifying the country would remain incomplete. Xi Jinping is rather focused on that issue.
All that is by way of explaining that there was zero chance that Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher would have the least bit of success in negotiating an extension of the New Territory treaty with Deng Xiaoping.
Why 1997?
In the run-up to 1842, the foreign tea-loving, opium-selling traders along the south-east coast of China were fed up with being told where they had to live, who they had to trade with, and that they couldn’t bring any women to the “factories” (warehouses) in which they were compelled to live. Who did these natives think they were dealing with?
The result was the 1842 Treaty of Nanking (today Nanjing) that ceded barren, poorly watered Hong Kong Island to Britain. More wars (1856-60, 1894, 1900) led to more unequal treaties (1858, 1860, 1898) and an expansion of the size of the colony. Only the last, the acquisition of the New Territories in 1898, was dressed up as a “lease.” The rest were taken by right of conquest.
Hence, the date: July 1, 1997, the day the 99-year lease drew to a close. There was no end date to any other part of Hong Kong, nor to the Portuguese colony of Macau, 40 miles away.
The 1980s
Now we have a date with which to work.
Government and business began considering issues such as very long-term land leases, and how the soon-to-be Chinese Hong Kong would be run. The currency markets took a dim view, and from 1980 began to sell. That year, the currency lost 11% of its value against the dollar. It fell a further 8% in 1982, and 16.5% in 1983. At that point, the financial authorities stepped in and pegged the exchange rate to HK$7.8:US$1.00, where it remains to this day.
The British colonial government began to plan for the handover as well. It knew that there was no hope of protecting the rights of the people of Hong Kong, and so after more than 140 years of refusing to allow any shred of democracy, in 1984 – the year I arrived – there began to be small steps toward some little bit of representational government.
In the 1980s, China was opening up, liberalizing, and generally becoming the hottest business opportunity on earth. While many were skeptical as to how long this might last, most people just put their heads down and made money. Serious money, for some, a good living for most.
All that was thrown up in the air in the spring of 1989. After a decade of economic liberalization, inflation had been running at 18-19% for a couple of years, and peaked in December 1988. Combined with cuts to student subsidies and a host of smaller issues, these challenges laid the groundwork for the trouble ahead.
Deng Xiaoping’s popular heir-apparent, Hu Yaobang, had been forced out by conservative elders in early 1987, and died on April 15, 1989. The genuine out-pouring of grief was reminiscent of the public’s response to the death of Zhou Enlai, in January 1976. This provided the spark – or the excuse – that ignited massive protests, and eventually the massacre of June 4, 1989.
That event triggered a huge exodus from Hong Kong that lasted many years. Anyone with the means to do so sought a foreign passport, as an insurance policy. Business was so good that many promptly returned with their new documents a year or three later, confident that they would be able to escape, if necessary.
The 1990s
Shortly after the upheaval of June 1989, Deng Xiaoping toured the area near the Hong Kong border. These Special Economic Zones were the driving force of China’s modernization, and heavily dependent on Hong Kong money, management, and logistics. His reassurances sparked a renewed surge in cross-border trade and investment. They did not, however, erase the memory of Tiananmen. People were nervous.
“What do you think will happen?”
“I don’t know. Will you stay?”
“I’m looking at a few opportunities.”
“Good luck.”
“You, too.”
The same conversation, the same uncertainty, the same fears, over and over.
Over the next eight years, from Tiananmen to the Handover, Hong Kong people ever more desperately sought to make as much money as possible, just in case. The booming economy drove up the stock market and real estate prices. Inflation had averaged 5.5% since I arrived in mid-1984, but in the eight years prior to the Handover prices rose by 7.5% a year.
In the political and economic analysis business, every pundit sought to stake out a perspective, an insight that had yet to occur to others. Optimists pointed to Governor Chris Patten’s efforts to stimulate political parties by opening up more legislative and district council seats to direct elections. Pessimists predicted that Martin Lee, Szeto Wah, Emily Lau, and other progressives would quickly be thrown out of office, and into jail. They were both mostly right.
Asia boomed.
Tiananmen was quickly followed by the collapse of European communism. The end of the Cold War divided attention between Europeans seeking to reestablish a coherent world view, and others who saw China as the greatest thing since fried rice. The World Wide Web and Human Genome Project were still pending. The here-and-now was the European Union, NAFTA, the Great Moderation, and dictators on the run.
Oh, the difference a day makes
On July 1, 1997, Hong Kong had a new landlord. On July 2, 1997, East Asia had a new future, and it had nothing to do with the Handover.
After a costly battle with currency speculators, the Bank of Thailand threw in the towel and let the Thai Baht devalue, sharply, on July 2nd. While Hong Kong was nursing the Mother of All Hangovers, the Baht dropped 16.7% in one day.
Two weeks later, Malaysia and Singapore relaxed their rigid exchange rate regimes, and it was off to the races. By the time the dust settled, currencies across the region had lost 20-80% of their value, except Hong Kong and to a lesser extend Taiwan and Japan.
Welcome to the new world, where the Asian Miracle had just ended.
(c) David O’Rear 2026