Reading the Tea Leaves:

Predictions for the Next

Politburo Standing Committee

The Chinese Communist Party (CCP)’s 20th National Party Congress will be held in the third week of October this year, and by all accounts General Secretary Xi Jinping, the “core” of the leadership, will bestow upon himself a third five-year term. No one since Mao Zedong himself has held the top formal titles for so long, and history tells us that this is not necessarily a good thing.

[The background to previous succession competitions were covered in Succession Politics in China (Sept 2021): https://eastasiapoliticseconomics.wordpress.com/2021/09/06/succession-politics-in-china/ ]

Since the founding of the People’s Republic of China (PRC), two seats on the Politburo Standing Committee (PBSC) have been held by the chairmen of the National People’s Congress (NPC) and Chinese People’s Political Consultative Congress (CPPCC), respectively. Those are important, but dead-end jobs: no one who has sat in those positions has ever been elevated to lead the party or state government.

Li Zhanshu (NPC) and Wang Yang (CPPCC) would therefore appear to be out of the running for the position of State Premier, and are likely at the end of their careers.

Since the early 1980s, another seat has been reserved for the head of the party Discipline Inspection Commission (DIC). This job involves eliminating corruption anywhere in the party, so long as it does not ruffle too many very senior feathers. Zhao Leji, the current occupant, is a protege of former DIC head (and current state Vice President) Wang Qishan, and has performed his tasks with both efficiency and sensitivity.

The Director of the General Office of the CCP Central Committee frequently moves up to the PBSC. Among those to do so were Yao Yilin, Hu Qili, Qiao Shi, Wen Jiabao, Zeng Qinghong, and the aforementioned Li Zhanshu. The current office-holder, Ding Xuexiang, is perhaps the most likely newcomer to be elevated to the top committee. He heads up Xi Jinping’s personal office, and acts as his top aide in many highly sensitive roles.

Executive Vice Premier Han Zheng was born in 1954, which probably makes him a candidate for retirement. The other senior vice premier is Hu Chunhua, nearly a decade younger and more experienced in provincial leadership. Han is closely aligned to Jiang Zemin’s Shanghai Clique while Hu is a product of the Communist Youth League (CYL) formerly run by Hu Jintao. Of the other two vice premiers, Sun Chunlan has the misfortune to be female (no woman has ever sat on the PBSC) and Liu He is a bit long in the tooth (he’s 70). If Xi Jinping is feeling magnanimous and wants to mend fences with the CYL, naming Hu Chunhua Premier would be a logical step.

Wang Huning, the ideological backbone of the last three administrations, will likely retain his seat at the table. He probably has the role of explaining to Xi Jinping’s colleagues why everything Xi does is correct, a valuable service. His bibliography includes such snore-fests as Jiang Zemin’s Three Represents, Hu Jintao’s Scientific Development, and Xi’s own Chinese Dream. Like Xi, his father was an early victim of Mao’s purges. His total lack of practical experience means he is no threat to anyone.

Beijing Party Secretary Cai Qi may be in line for a promotion, too. He and Xi Jinping worked in Fujian and Zhejiang provinces at the same times over a period of more than 20 years. There may be a seat running the CPPCC in his future.

The final candidate is Guo Shengkun, Xi’s top deputy in the security sector. Guo turns 68 on the day the 20th National Party Congress opens, which is recent years has been the cut-off age for further promotion. However, that “rule” has as much authority as the two-term limit that Xi abandon back in 2018, so nothing can be taken for granted. Guo sits on the party’s working-level Secretariat and heads the Central Political and Legal Affairs Commission, which manages courts and the police. If Guo needs a post to justify his place on the PBSC (he is from the Shanghai Clique, and closest to former VP Zeng Qinghong), the national legislature (NPC) wouldn’t be a bad fit.

So, the line up is likely to be Xi Jinping, Zhao Leji, Wang Huning, Ding Xuexiang, Hu Chunhua, Cai Qi, and Guo Shengkun. There may not be seven member, or these may not be the correct ones; that’s Chinese politics.

Author: David O'Rear

Asia-oriented professional macro-economist, political analyst and policy adviser for over 35 years.

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